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INCOME TAXATION AND EQUITYa 
 
Peter J. Lambertb 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper exposes and explains the various ways in which value judgements can 
be instilled into an income tax system, or, if inherent in a pre-existing one, can be drawn out and 
understood. A putative EU-wide income tax, additional to the national income taxes of the 
Member States, is analysed. When the identification of equals is done using an appropriate 
‘equivalent income function’, and the equal treatment command modelled in terms of it, the 
resultant tax will in general be differentiated between countries. A supplementary command, 
“equal progression among equals”, can be achieved if equals are defined as those at the same 
percentile point in the within-country distributions, and if these distributions differ in logarithms 
only by location and scale. Differentiated proportional taxes could even be equitable, the flat 
rate being higher in less unequal countries. The value judgements implicit in a given tax system 
can be exposed in terms of an equivalence scale which is in general “base dependent”.  
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RESUMEN: Este trabajo expone y explica las diversas formas en que los juicios de valor 
pueden ser incorporados en un sistema de imposición personal sobre la renta o, en el caso de 
que sean inherentes al sistema fiscal pre-existente, puedan ser derivados y entendidos. Se 
analiza a través de un impuesto putativo sobre la renta para toda la UE, adicional a los de cada 
Estado miembro. Cuando los iguales se identifican a través de una "función de renta 
equivalente" apropiada, y su tratamiento se impone en esos términos, en general, el impuesto 
debe ser diferente entre países. Un requisito adicional, "igual progresividad entre iguales", 
puede ser alcanzado si los iguales se definen como aquéllos que se hallan en el mismo percentil 
de renta de la distribución dentro de cada país, y si estas distribuciones difieren en logaritmos 
sólo en localización y escala. Impuestos proporcionales diferenciados podrían incluso ser 
equitativos, siendo el tipo lineal mayor en los países en que la distribución de renta sea más 
igualitaria. Los juicios de valor implícitos en un sistema fiscal pueden ser expuestos en términos 
de una escala de equivalencia que, en general, es "dependiente de la base". 
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As the unique tax instrument through which the government approaches its citizens 
directly, the income tax is particularly subject to criteria of equity. Classical horizontal 
equity (HE) and vertical equity (VE), two basic commands of social justice, state 
respectively that equals should be treated equally, and unequals appropriately 
unequally. HE can be seen as a minimal rule of fairness, offering protection against 
arbitrary discrimination and reflecting the basic principle of equal worth. VE requires 
differentiation among unequals, and its degree is a matter of societal taste and political 
debate. See Musgrave (1990) and Steuerle (1999) for thoughtful discussion. In this 
paper, we outline the conceptual and measurement issues involved in characterizing the 
horizontal and vertical stance of an income tax or tax and benefit system, and sketch 
some appropriate measurement procedures. We also discuss the issue of de novo tax 
design from an equity perspective, taking as a case in point a putative EU-wide income 
tax, formed as an additional layer of tax rather than through harmonization of Member 
States’ existing direct tax systems. 
In thus exposing the equity (or, indeed, inequity) characteristics of an existing tax, 
alongside the principles which should govern the introduction of a new tax, the paper 
should provide a window into the methodologies economists have developed to analyze 
the value judgements governing the direct taxation of a country’s citizens.   
As simplistically described above, it might seem that HE is an absolute, and VE, being 
a matter of societal taste, requires a value judgement. Yet it is not this simple. Much 
recent analysis of the tax system’s horizontal stance is designed to expose horizontal 
inequity (HI), for example by quantifying the extent to which a personal income tax 
fails to be equitable as a family tax. This assumes that the tax designers were incapable 
of achieving the HE ideal. Household equivalence scales are typically invoked to 
identify the equals (and unequals), a value judgement which becomes centrally 
important for the analysis. (And not the only one; what ought “equal treatment” to 
mean?). Analysis of the HE stance of the tax system is, in almost all current literature, 
essentially normative. As for the vertical stance, distributional analysts tend to assume 
that the social decision-maker has selected, and enacted, a desired degree of 
progressivity, manifest in the tax system’s impact on inequality; if this belief is 
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followed, the characterization of a tax system’s VE becomes an exercise in positive 
economics.1  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explain briefly the concepts 
underlying vertical and horizontal equity. This involves discussion of progressivity and 
redistributive effect, the definition of equals and the meaning of equal tax treatment. 
We begin Section 3, on evaluating existing tax systems, by outlining the dominating 
strand of literature of the 1990s, according to which HE violations are captured by 
indices as loss of redistributive effect (vertical performance) in a measurement system 
that attributes to the policymaker the same degree of aversion to both horizontal and 
vertical inequality. We go on to describe a recent development in HI measurement 
which obviates this restriction.   
In Section 4, we discuss some of the issues that would face the designer of a new 
income tax, taking as a “vehicle” for this analysis a putative EU-wide income tax, 
additional to the national income taxes of the Member States, whose revenue would go 
directly to the centre. The question of an EU-wide social welfare function (henceforth 
SWF) arises, in which a person’s domicile may or may not be a relevant factor. By 
drawing on recent work in the regional context, we observe that if a common income 
tax were devised, applicable in all countries, then however equitable, the VE of the 
entire system (in fact, overall inequality and welfare) can be unambiguously improved 
by allowing an element of differentiation in this tax, potentially admitting HI.  
In Section 5, we explicitly allow for differences in the taxable capacities of persons or 
households in the Member States, and discuss the design issues this raises. A recently 
developed equity command, equal progression among equals, which could be said to 
mix vertical and horizontal aspects, may be achievable alongside HE and VE, and is so 
if the equals in different countries are defined as those at the same given percentile point 
in their within-country distributions, and if these distributions differ in logarithms only 
                                                 
1 A third equity criterion, that of "no reranking" (NR), has coexisted with HE and VE in the measurement 
literature for almost 25 years, and is variously seen as an alternative to HE or a supplement to VE. 
According to this line of analysis, inequity is conceptualized as lack of perfect association between pre-
tax and post-tax living standards and "addresses the fairness of a process of redistribution" (Plotnick, 
1981, p. 283). The classical view is that HE "enters as an end-state principle" (Musgrave, 1990, p. 120). 
We shall not dwell upon NR much in this paper; see Lambert and Yitzhaki (1994) and Dardanoni and 
Lambert (2001) for further discussion. For discussion of equity issues surrounding indirect taxes, which 
are not dealt with here, see for example Loomis and Revier (1988) and Decoster et al. (1997).  
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by location and scale (as would be the case for lognormality).  In such a scenario, we 
show, differentiated proportional taxes would be equitable, with the flat rate being 
higher in less unequal countries.  
Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the detection of the value judgements that might 
underlie such a future EU-wide tax, were it to have been imposed by the politicians 
without the advice of the economists. New work is explained which can draw out of the 
tax itself the implied value judgements of the decision makers about equals, through a 
base-dependent equivalence scale, turning horizontal tax analysis into a positive 
exercise, much as vertical analysis now is. Section 7 concludes with an assessment of 
what has been achieved in the paper, namely, an exposition and explanation of the 
various ways in which value judgements can be instilled into an income tax system, or, 
if inherent in a pre-existing one, can be understood.  
 
2. Vertical and horizontal equity 
The simplest model of an income tax schedule is one in which the tax liability on an 
income of x is a pure function of that income; let us write it t(x).We might assume that 
t(x) is differentiable (almost everywhere), that 0  t(x)  x and 0  t'(x)  1 for all x, and, for 
progression, that t(x)/x is increasing (i.e. t’(x) > t(x)/x). If net incomes n(x) = x - t(x) are 
plotted against gross incomes x, the relationship is typically upward sloping and 
concave, showing clearly that relative income differentials get compressed in the 
transition from gross to net income (see Figure 1). As this figure also shows, negative 
income taxes, i.e. cash benefits, can be incorporated into the model simply by dropping 
the assumption that 0  t(x). Then the graph cuts the 45º line at the break-even point 
between cash benefits and taxes. Letting g be the fraction of all income taken in tax, or 
‘total tax ratio’, g = Σt(x)/ Σx, the distributive effect of the actual tax can be compared 
with that of an equal-yield proportional tax (hence at rate g) on all income units: clearly 
the rich pay more, and the poor pay less, under the actual (progressive) schedule. It is as 
if, first, a flat tax at rate g were imposed, with no exemption, and then rich-to-poor 
transfers undertaken. The redistributive effect (RE) of such an income tax schedule is 
measured by its inequality effect relative to that of the flat tax (which is, of course, 
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neutral in inequality terms):  
(1)  RE   =   IN - IX[1-g]  =   IN - IX 
where I is an index of relative inequality and the subscript indicates the distribution of 
income concerned (N for net incomes n(x), X for gross incomes x, etc). 
 
This model stood throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, following the seminal articles of 
Fellman (1976), Jakobsson (1976) and Kakwani (1977a,b).2 The model is good if the 
population in question is homogeneous in all attributes but income, but plainly 
inadequate if we wish to take account of non-income attributes which differ between 
income units in the tax code. This is very common. For example, deductions and 
exemptions may be awarded for charitable giving, medical expenditures, mortgage 
interest (Johnson and Mayer, 1962), life insurance premia, work expenses, childcare 
costs, etc. Differences in income tax treatment on non-income grounds may also arise 
through different sources and disposition of income (Gravelle, 1992), tax evasion and 
                                                 



















non-compliance (Bishop et al., 1994), and the different treatment of urban and rural 
incomes especially in developing countries. In such cases, we need to model the income 
tax code as a multi-attribute one.  
The question arises, whether the tax deductions (etc) are equitable, and this is usually 
taken to mean horizontally equitable: do pre-tax equals get equal tax treatment? 
Towards the end of the paper, we shall see how to impute a concept of equal treatment 
to the tax designer, which is such that an automatic response of “yes” can be given in 
answer to this question. More typically, we might want to know if a given multi-
attribute income tax can be judged equitable in its treatment of families of different 
compositions and needs. The HE ideal, or aspiration, typically refers to individuals. To 
extend it to families, equivalence scales are usually invoked.  
The first step is to turn the business of identifying the equals - and the unequals, for that 
matter - into a unidimensional problem.3 We shall require income units' pre-tax 
incomes, or living standards, call these x, to be measured on a scale which identifies the 
equals: equals will be those having the same pre-tax income x. Manser (1979) discusses 
the modelling of household objectives including different leisure times of their 
members, and Rosen (1978) demonstrates an empirical procedure which, given rich 
enough microdata, will "generate two vectors, one of family utilities before tax and one 
of family utilities after tax", and he goes on to say that "the real problem in measuring 
horizontal equity is to summarize the differences between these vectors in a meaningful 
way" (p. 314). Gravelle (1992) quotes Steuerle (1983) as advocating an equivalization 
procedure to provide "a working definition of equity" across family sizes. As we shall 
see, a generalized notion of equivalence scale is called for in order to explain some 
features of the typical income tax system, and to articulate new equity criteria.  
 
                                                 
3 Many public economists would dispute the unidimensional form to which the HE problem is reduced by 
recourse to a living standards criterion. Why, for example, should the tax treatment of a person whose 
income derives from his chosen holding of government bonds, with tax-privileged yield, be the same as 
that of another person whose living standard is derived from earnings or profits? This kind of objection 
suggests extending the dimensionality of the problem, possibly ad infinitum. If we would give full 
credence to questions of the form "Can we ever find true equals?", we would be led simply to inspect the 
tax code for society's chosen form of tax treatment, and its inferred definition of equals; this would all but 
throw the baby away with the bath water, turning the HI question simply into one of tracking down 




If the first problem is how to define the equals, the second, which follows hard upon it, 
is, what do we mean by "equal treatment"? A widely accepted equal treatment 
command is, equal post-tax living standards for pre-tax equals; other commands, equal 
average tax rates and equal taxes among equals respectively, can be interpreted as 
variants on this (see Lambert, 2003). 
The income unit may be the individual, the family, the household or that virtual person 
known as the 'equivalent adult', advocated for welfare analysis when using equivalent 
income distributions by Ebert (1997).4  
One equivalence scale which is popular with distributional analysts is the doubly-
parametric scale of Cutler and Katz (1992), in which household money income is 
deflated by a factor m = (NA + θNC)Φ, in which NA and NC are the numbers of adults 
and children in the household respectively, θ ∈  [0,1] measures the relative importance 
of children and φ ∈  [0,1] represents economies of scale. Figure 2 shows the relationship 
between gross equivalent income and net equivalent income for the UK tax and benefit 
system for 1993 when θ = φ = ½. As is apparent, there are plenty of instances of HI 
here: vertically aligned data points represent families with the same pre-tax living 
standard but differing post-tax living standards.5  
 
                                                 
4 Suppose that z(n) is the equivalence scale value to be used to deflate the money income x of a family of 
size n. Ebert shows that if z(n) virtual persons are each allotted an equivalent income or living standard of 
x/z(n), then - and only then - will small money transfers from higher to lower living standard families 
necessarily be overall welfare-improving. Empirically, it is a matter of using the equivalence scale 
deflators as sample weights. 
 






Lambert and Ramos (1997) and Duclos and Lambert (2000) each provide a 
decomposition of redistributive effect into orthogonal vertical and horizontal 
components: 
(2)  RE = V- H 
in which V measures the inequality-reducing impact of the tax system on average, and 
H a loss due to the ‘new’ inequality introduced by the presence of HI.6, 7 
All three of the studies just cited could be said to “impose HI from the outside”since 
they use the Cutler and Katz (1992) equivalence scale for selected parameter values. A 
more defensible procedure would be to search for the HI-minimizing choice of 
equivalence scale parameters for each regime, before undertaking any comparisons: this 
could both reveal the equivalence scales most nearly implicit in the tax systems under 
examination, and enable comparisons of residual HI given those scales. This kind of 
analysis has not been seen yet (but see Aronson et al. 1994, and van de Ven et al. 2001 
for steps in this direction). 
Finally, we mention a very recent HI contribution, that of Auerbach and Hassett (2002), 
which offers new scope for understanding a tax system’s horizontal and vertical equity 
characteristics. The authors’ point of departure from the mainstream of the 1990s, as 
already described, is to institute a measurement system in which the SWF “need not 
evaluate 'global' (vertical equity) differences in after-tax income using the same weights 
                                                 
6 In each paper, this loss is measured locally as inequality of post-tax income among pre-tax equals, and 
aggregated into a global index using a weighting scheme. In the first, which uses the Gini coefficient, the 
“- H” term is augmented by a measure of reranking. See also Aronson and Lambert (1994) on this. 
Musgrave (1990) suggested the business of devising a local HI measure and then aggregating. The 
"identification problem" had beset many earlier studies of HI. If a sample contains few or no exact 
equals, how can we make it tell us anything about HI? One solution is to band people pre-tax, into 'close 
equals groups', and to measure inequality effects between and within these groups (see van der Ven et al., 
2001 for more on this in respect of the Gini approach). The other solution is to use a kernel procedure to 
estimate non-parametrically and consistently the continuous population distributions of pre- and post-tax 
living standards from the sample joint distribution, and thence the indices V and -H (see Duclos and 
Lambert, 2000). 
 
7 In order to track the changing vertical and horizontal characteristics of a tax system through time, 
concomitant with an ever-changing income distribution, point measures of vertical and horizontal 
performance at each percentile in the pre-tax distribution have been developed, in Hayes et al (1994) and 
Duclos and Lambert (2000) respectively. Given suitable data over a run of years, it is possible to produce 
2-dimensional contour plots of the levels of progression and local horizontal inequity, at each 




as it applies to 'local' (horizontal equity) differences”. It is the very sameness of these 
weights, in the studies already cited, which leads to the commensurate vertical and 
horizontal components V and -H of redistributive effect. Auerbach and Hassett allow 
that a social decision-maker could have a different aversion to inequality between 
unequals from his aversion to inequality introduced by the tax system among equals.8 
With the measures these authors present, a search for the HI-minimizing values of the 
two respective inequality aversion parameters could reveal the horizontal and vertical 
stance most nearly implicit in the tax system.  
 
4. A putative EU-wide income tax: VE and HE 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a new layer of income tax were to be introduced 
in the EU, with the proceeds going directly to the center. What would be the issues 
facing the designer of such a tax? What would be the appropriate base for it? Should the 
tax be proportional, or one embodying the progressive principle? One can imagine the 
new tax being levied at a flat rate on all disposable incomes, in order not to interfere 
with relative income differentials within countries. It is a small leap from there to 
suppose that a concessionary rate for the poorest countries might be instituted, and 
another small leap to a plethora of flat rates, negotiated country-by-country by the 
politicians. (Note, though, that an EU-wide income tax has not been advised by 
economists, see e.g. Cnossen 2002, pp. 76-76 on this; however the spectre of such a 
development has been mentioned from time to time in the popular press, in the UK at 
least).9 In this section of the paper, we make some pertinent observations, before 
proceeding, in the next section, to develop formally an equity criterion taking into 
account, through an EU-wide SWF, the possibly differing taxable capacities of persons 
or households in the various Member States. 
                                                 
8 This construction clearly meets a view expressed by Steuerle (1999): “Many people strongly support 
horizontal equity even though they reject the notion that government must adjust the position of any 
individual along any particular scale (for example, they may oppose redistribution). I do not think they 
are inconsistent in holding these two positions”.  
 
9 To whit, consider the headline “”Now Britain faces single European tax system: France and Germany 




A theoretical construction of Cubel and Lambert (2002a,b) points the way. Even in the 
absence of country-specific dimensions in the EU-wide SWF, it can be welfare 
improving, and inequality reducing in the strongest sense (of Lorenz dominance), to 
impose country-specific income taxes rather than a common one across all countries. 
Specifically, these papers demonstrate that if two (or more) regions in a federation have 
very different levels of well-being then, whatever common new tax layer t(x) one might 
envisage, where x is a person or household’s disposable income regardless of domicile, 
be it proportional or progressive, VE can be enhanced by rewriting the tax code to 
include an appropriate differentiation. Let n(x) = x - t(x) be a person or household’s net 
disposable income after application of the EU-wide tax t(x). Let A and B be regions 
(groups of countries, for example) such that people in A are “generally poorer” than 
people in B (there is a precise technical condition for this which can be found in either 
paper; it permits significant overlap between the distributions). A welfare improvement 
and inequality reduction obtains if, instead of t(x) being imposed, a differentiated tax 
were instituted such that net incomes became (1+θ)n(x) for a person with income x 
living in A, and (1-λ)n(x) for a person living in B, where θ and λ are small, and such 
that total revenue is maintained.10 
But of course this recipe introduces HI: people with a given income (living standard) x 
who live in A will pay less tax than people with x who happen to live in B. It may seem 
strange that the introduction of HI could improve matters, for the conventional wisdom 
says the opposite: whenever disparity is introduced, where there was equality before, 
welfare is reduced (Atkinson, 1970). In the tax context, Kakwani and Lambert (1999, p. 
28) put their finger(s) on it: "Discrimination can be interpreted as the loss of vertical 
equity attributable to group specificity of schedules in the tax code. If the code were to 
be replaced by the averaged schedule, there would be a welfare increase". There appears 
to be a conundrum here. Starting with a common schedule t(x), differentiation reduces 
inequality and raises welfare; but then averaging liabilities across the differentiated 
regions would also do that - and so on, re-differentiating, re-averaging.... welfare 
improvements ad infinitum? 
                                                 
10 In the case of proportional taxes, this says that rather than taxing all people in the EU at a common rate 
flat g, VE would be unambiguously enhanced by taxing people in the poorer group of countries at a lower 




The conundrum is resolved by noticing that the informational requirements involved in 
this (continual) re-processing of tax liabilities place a limit on its feasibility. After 
averaging the differentiated tax, net income for somebody with living standard x would 
become (1+θ)p(x)n(x) + (1-λ)(1-p(x))n(x), where p(x) is the proportion of income units 
having living standard x who live in region A. This would bring demographics into the 
tax code (when p(x) ≠ 0 or 1), complicating the informational requirement and causing a 
loss of transparency, surely an important consideration. 
Differentiation of an income tax across countries can as well be rationalized if the EU-
wide social welfare function contains country-specific dimensions, and in this case 
obviously need not involve HI. For example, the equal sacrifice model, but with a 
different utility-of-income function in each country, could be invoked to rationalize 
different taxes.11 Atkinson and Bourguignon’s (1987) utilitarian SWF admits of 
dimensions other than income. For a population divided into "needs groups" i = 1,2,....n, 
a different utility-of-income function Ui(x) is attributed to each group, with a hierarchy 
of needs specified by a systematic ordering of marginal utilities Ui´(x), i = 1,2,....n, at 
each fixed income level x. This model could perhaps be adapted to the equal sacrifice 
framework, but such an extension has not yet been made. In fact, it is not clear that such 
a model would be appropriate in the EU context. As between an income unit in 
Germany having $60,000 p.a. and an income unit in Latvia also having $60,000 p.a., 
which is socially the more deserving of an additional dollar? Arguably the one in 
Germany suffers more relative deprivation than the one in Latvia, being further down its 
country-specific distribution of living standards (Runciman, 1976); but would this merit 
a more lenient income tax in Germany? Does not one’s intuition go the other way? 
There is an intricate issue here for income tax design, to which we now turn. 
 
                                                 
11 According to equal (absolute) sacrifice theory, if U(x) is the utility-of-income function, the income tax 
t(x) should be designed to satisfy U(x) - U(x-t(x))  ≡ uo  ∀ x. Samuelson (1947) showed that if -
xU"(x)/U'(x) > 1 ∀ x > 0 then such a t(x) is progressive. Ok (1995) demonstrated a reverse result, that if 
an income tax schedule t(x) satisfies t'(x) > 0 and t"(x) > 0 ∀ x, then there exists a U(x) with respect to 
which t(x) is equal sacrifice. See also Mitra and Ok (1996,1997) and D'Antoni (1999). Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1984) point to a perceived problem with equal sacrifice taxes, that they provide no link 
between tax payments and the benefits received by income units from the proceeds: "This approach 




5. Designing a differentiated income tax: equity issues 
For simplicity at this point, let us confine attention to a population divided into two 
mutually exclusive and socially homogeneous subgroups, A and B say, and let us 
assume that group membership enters into the SWF as well as income level. Then we 
may adapt the equivalizing concept, and posit an equivalent income function, which can 
be used to identify the equals across groups in terms of their living standards. For group 
A, we could suppose that living standard is expressed by money income, and then let S: 
+ → + be the function which expresses the living standard of an income unit 
belonging to group B with income x. For n > 2 groups, n-1 such functions would be 
needed. The equivalent income function has been proposed in this more general setting 
by Donaldson and Pendakur (1999), and examined in detail in Ebert (2000). The most 
obvious context for all of this is when A an B denote different household characteristics, 
e.g. A comprising singles and B couples. We shall use this example to interpret some of 
the results which follow, but the setting is general enough for A and B to be two (groups 
of) countries. The function S(x) need only be continuous and strictly increasing.  
Thus a member of group A with income xA and a member of group B with income xB 
are equals if and only if S(xB) = xA. Let the tax schedules for A and B be tA(x) and tB(x) 
respectively, and let vA(x) = x – tA(x) and vB(x) = x - tB(x) be post-tax income functions. 
If by equal treatment we mean that those with the same pre-tax living standard should 
also have the same post-tax living standard, this requires the following property: S(xB) = 
xA ⇒ vA(xA) = S(vB(xB)); or, writing xB as x and substituting, 
(3)  S(vB(x)) = vA(S(x)) 
In words, the living standard after tax of a member of group B (e.g. a couple) having x 
before tax should be the same as that of a member of A (single) having S(x) before 
tax.12  
The equivalent income function for a constant relative equivalence scale is of the form 
S(x) = x/m where m is the deflator for the money incomes in B. This is the familiar 
                                                 
12 If, on the other hand, ‘equal treatment’ would mean that pre-tax equals should experience equal average 
tax rates, the criterion would be tA(S(x))/ S(x) = tB(x)/ x. If equal treatment is taken to mean equal tax 
payments, then tA(S(x)) = tB(x) is the criterion. For more on these two, see Lambert (2003).  
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scenario for equivalizing household incomes. In a regional context, m could be a price 
deflator rendering region B money incomes into real terms as measured in A; then 
equals are those with the same real incomes (but see on for other possible definitions of 
equals in this context). Substituting in (3), the horizontally equitable tax for B, given a 
schedule tA(x) for A, must satisfy: 
(4)  vB(x) = m.vA(x/m) 
In the context of families, this is precisely the quotient familial tax system, as used in 
France and Luxembourg and already anticipated by Vickrey (1947, pp. 295-6): "A more 
thoroughgoing and equitable procedure [than exemptions and credits] would be to set 
up some factor indicative of the needs of the entire family, divide the total income by 
this factor, compute a per capita tax on this 'per capita income', and multiply the tax so 
computed by the family size factor to obtain the total tax for the family". In the regional 
context, with m as the price deflator, it simply says that people in B should be taxed as 
they would be in A on the real value of their incomes. 
The equivalent income function for a constant absolute equivalence scale is of the form 
S(x) = x-a, where a > 0 is a constant. Members of B (couples) need a fixed addition a to 
their income to be judged equal to members of A (singles) at the same income level. 
Substituting in (3), the horizontally equitable tax for B satisfies 
(5)  vB(x) = vA(x-a) + a 
In the singles/couples context, the constant a is a married couple’s exemption or 
allowance: couples should receive the first a of their income tax-free and pay tax at the 
same rate as singles on the balance x-a (assuming x > a).  
In the family context, if an income tax system is not of one of these two very 
straightforward types, then it cannot be rationalized in terms of a constant relative or 
absolute equivalence scale using the equal treatment command in (3). Insofar as the 
British, Spanish and Canadian direct tax systems are not of this type - and they certainly 
are not - the analyses of Aronson et al. (1994), Lambert and Ramos (1997) and Duclos 
and Lambert (2000) of HI in the UK, Spanish and Canadian direct tax systems, which 
are undertaken using constant relative equivalence scales, are indeed vulnerable to the 
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accusation of “imposing HI from the outside”. 
In order to design an equitable EU-wide additional layer of tax, an equivalent income 
function S: + → + (or set of equivalent income functions Si: + → +, 2  i  n) would 
first be needed, to relate living standards in countries in group B at a given taxable 
income level with those in group A (or to relate living standards in countries 2,3.... n 
with those in country 1, in the case of fully differentiated taxes). Then, setting tA(x) as 
the “reference” schedule which can embody any chosen degree of VE, tB(x) would have 
to be designed to satisfy (3) (or, ti(x) 2  i  n would have to be designed to satisfy (3) with 
respect to t1(x)) for full-blown equity. This kind of analysis has not been undertaken as 
yet, even in the family context,13 but a recent finding of Ebert and Lambert (2002) 
provides a potentially interesting way forward. 
Suppose that the equivalent income function can be argued to take the isoelastic form, 
S(x) = (x/b)a where a > 0 and b > 0 are constants. Ebert and Lambert (2002) examine 
the consequences for the degree of progression faced by equals in this scenario. When 
the tax system {tA(x), tB(x)} is constructed to obey (3) and S(x) is isoelastic, members 
of group A with a given pre-tax living standard face the same degree of progression as 
members of group B with that same pre-tax living standard. Thus an extended concept 
of equity, equal progression among equals, is attainable in this case (and in fact, in only 
the isoelastic case).14  
Putting S(x) = (x/b)a into (3), and taking tA(x) as given, a formula for tB(x) results which 
is in general complicated, but in the special case in which tA(x) is proportional, tA(x) = 
gAx say, we find from (3) that for equity, tB(x) should also be proportional:  
(6)   tB(x) = gBx where gB = 1 - (1 - gA)1/a  
                                                 
13 In that context, if the Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) SWF were adopted along with the equal 
sacrifice model, then the type-specific utility functions UA(x) and UB(x) would define the equivalent 
income function S through the property UB(xB) = UA(S(xB)); that is, S = UA-1 ° UB.  
 
14 See op cit. for further details, and also Dardanoni and Lambert (2002). The progression measure is 
residual progression, defined for a schedule t(x) as the elasticity of post-tax income v(x) = x - t(x) with 
respect to pretax income, i.e. as xv´(x)/v(x). In the family context, the isoelastic form been recommended 
by Donaldson and Pendakur (1999) on positive grounds, as one which provides less restrictive household 
demand functions than any constant equivalence scale m (viz. than S(x) = x/m for any m > 0), and can be 




In contradistinction to the result discussed in the previous section of the paper, we see 
from this that an EU-wide layer of differentiated proportional taxes could be supported 
as fully equitable if a ≠ 1.15  
An intriguing possibility arises if we suppose that the country-specific income 
distributions are all lognormal, or indeed, belong to any family of distributions which in 
logarithms is location and scale invariant.16 In precisely this case, an isoelastic function 
xB = S(xA) exists which matches the incomes in A and B position by position. If in this 
case we would assert that, in the different EU countries, the equals are those at the 
same percentile point,17 then (3) can be used to specify an EU-wide layer of additional 
income tax which both assures “equal treatment by percentile” in the classical sense and 
also “equal progression by percentile”. Proportional EU taxes (which, as we have said, 
have the advantage of not interfering with relative income differentials within countries) 
would have to be differentiated to the extent that inequality differed between countries; 
the rate would be higher in less unequal countries, and lower in more unequal 
countries.18 
 
6. Understanding a differentiated income tax  
It is more than likely that any eventual EU-wide layer of direct tax will be the outcome 
of negotiations by the politicians, each seeking to build in concessions for the country 
he or she represents. If such a tax package emerges, how may we infer its equity 
characteristic? In formal terms, the problem is this. Suppose that we the economists are 
presented, fait accompli, with differentiated schedules {tA(x), tB(x)} for countries 
                                                 
15 It is clear from (6) that gB > gA if a < 1 and gB < gA if a > 1. The case a = 1 in the family context would 
be that of a constant relative equivalence scale. In this case, if the singles are taxed proportionally, then 
for equity so should the couples be, and at the same rate. That is, a common proportional tax on the living 
standards of all households is equitable. 
 
16 Other examples include the Pareto and Singh-Maddala distributions. 
 
17 Clearly this would argue for the different tax treatment of an income unit in Germany having $60,000 
p.a. and an income unit in Latvia also having $60,000 p.a., a question we posed earlier.  
 
18 If ln xA N(µA, σA2) and ln xB N(µB, σB2) then S(x) = (x/b)a matches incomes position by position for a = 
σB/σA and b = exp (µA - a.µB). If the Lorenz curves for A and B differ (so that σB ≠ σA, i.e. a ≠1), and if 
tA(x) is proportional, then (as already noted) for “equity by percentile” tB(x) would be proportional too, 
but with a different rate. As observed in footnote 17,  gB > gA if σB < σA and vice versa. 
 
17 
classified into two groups A and B (or more generally with a bundle {ti(x) : 1  i  n} of 
schedules, one for each country). Can we find an equivalent income function S(x) (or 
bundle of n-1 such functions {Si(x) : 2  i  n}) such that (3) holds between the net income 
functions vA(x) and vB(x) (or the analogue of (3) between v1(x) and each vi(x), 2  i  n)? 
If so, we can judge the package to be equitable, and explain to the public through an 
examination of S(x) the value judgement about equals across EU countries that is 
implicit. If not, the EU-wide tax must be judged inequitable by the standard of our equal 
treatment command (3).  
In general, given {tA(x), tB(x)}, no such function S(x) exists. A particular result of 
Lambert and Yitzhaki (1997) deomonstrates this: in the family context, there exists no 
equivalent income function S(x) compatible with the equal treatment criterion (3) for a 
tax system which corrects for differences in need by means of a tax credit.19 
Of course, we can recognize the equity characteristic of a tax system {tA(x), tB(x)} 
satisfying (4), (5) or (6), since we drew these tax systems out of particular functional 
forms for S(x). We could push things a little further. If S(x) does exist for a tax system 
{tA(x), tB(x)}, define m(x) and a(x) by S(x) = x/m(x) = x - a(x). That is, regard the 
equivalizing procedure as generated by an income-related relative or absolute 
equivalence scale.20 Now apply (3): 
(7)   vB(x) = m(vB(x)).vA(x/m(x)) = vA(x-a(x)) + a(vB(x)) 
The interpretation of these forms is clearest in the family context. On the left, we have a 
quotient familial-type rule, in which the household is split into m(x) parts, each being 
taxed separately - but then the taxes are re-combined with a correction, for equity, to 
allow for the change in the scale value in the transition from pre-tax to post-tax income. 
                                                 
19 The point is very simply shown. Let C be the married couple’s tax credit and substitute vB(x) = vA(x) + 
C into (3): S(vA(x) + C) = vA(S(x)). Supposing only that vA(x) x ∀ x and that ∃ xo : vA(xo) = xo (i.e. that 
there are no single benefit recipients and there exists at least one income level at which the tax liability for 
a single is zero), we find from (3) that S(xo + C) = vA(S(xo)), i.e. that vA(S(xo)) > S(xo), an immediate 
contradiction. Lambert and Yitzhaki (1997) reach the same conclusion in a more general model with n > 
2 household types. 
 
20 Income-related equivalence scales have been around in the equity context since at least Seneca and 
Taussig (1971), who remark that “the most interesting and important issues involving the application of 
equivalence scales to tax equity questions are intimately bound up with the variation of equivalence scales 




On the right, we have an income-related married couple’s deduction: couples receive 
the first portion a(x) of their income x tax-free, and pay tax at the same rate as singles 
on the balance x-a(x), but again there is a correction for equity, an extra a(vB(x)) - a(x) 
of tax-free income being given to allow for the change in the absolute equivalence scale 
value in the transition from pre-tax to post-tax income. If the putative EU-wide tax 
system {tA(x), tB(x)}took either one of these two forms, it would be equitable for the 
relevant income-related equivalence scale.  
How should we analyze the VE and HI characteristics of an EU-wide income tax 
system for which we cannot recognize a function S(x) providing the definition of 
equals? We are left only with normative analysis. If the tax is in operation then, starting 
with sample data drawn from the joint distribution of pre-tax and post-tax living 
standards across EU countries, we could impose a constant relative scale (e.g. one 
rendering nominal incomes in B into real values in A’s terms), and assess the vertical 
and horizontal contributions to overall redistributive effect as in (2). This would tell us 
to what extent the EU-wide tax departs from an idealized tax on citizens’ real incomes, 
and how unequally citizens at different real income values are dealt with on average.  
In fact, a model of Ramos and Lambert (2003) may be appropriate here, which extends  
the HI measurement framework of the 1990s by admitting some “deserving attributes” 
into the idealized tax function, in addition to (real) income. The idea here would be to 
assess the performance of the EU-wide tax against that of an idealized tax schedule 
τ(e,d), where e is living standard and d denotes domicile (in the EU context; but more 
generally d can be any attribute for which special tax treatment has been sanctioned by 
the politicians or tax authorities). The measurement system permits the inequity effect 
of sanctioned tax breaks to be distinguished from the inequity effect of non-sanctioned 
differences in tax treatment (if any), the former amounting to an authorized loss of VE, 
and the latter to a residual form of classical HI. Equation (2) becomes 
(8)    RE =  [V - D] - J, 
in this context, where, as in (2), V is the redistributive effect of the tax on average (in 
our case, on the real incomes of  EU citizens), D denotes the loss of VE due to the 
country-specific factors in the tax system, and J is the loss from non-domicile related 
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differences in tax treatment apparent in the data (such as assessment and recording 
errors) at given real income levels. 
Such a measurement exercise, intrinsically normative, can be said to “impose HI from 
the outside” since it assumes a definition of equals known not to be implicit in the tax 
system, and measures departures of the tax from such an ideal. In a recent and very 
exciting  development,  Muellbauer and van der Ven (2002, 2003) have found a way 
forward for positive analysis, by varying the definition of equals and the equal treatment 
command used in this paper to show that: "...tax and benefits systems are consistent 
with the equivalence scale methodology, even if they are not designed in coherence 
with it". 
Thus far we have defined equals through the equivalent income function S(x), and equal 
tax treatment by (3). Defining income-related equivalence scales m(x) and a(x) by S(x) 
= x/m(x) = x - a(x), we demonstrated how the equitable taxes (in (7)) would have to 
contain “equity corrections” for the variations which take place in the scale value in the 
transition from pre-tax income x to post-tax income vB(x). But if we think of m(x) and 
a(x) as constant for the couple with gross income x – defined, for example, in terms of 
their ability or effort - that is, base-dependent rather than income-level-dependent21 - 
then a different equal treatment command obtains. Specifically, the command becomes 
xA = xB/m(xB) ⇒ vA(xA) = vB(xB)/m(xB) in the relative case and xA = xB - a(xB) ⇒ 
vA(xA) = vB(xB) – a(xB) in the absolute case. These lead to a quotient-familial-type tax in 
the one case, and a tax with an income-related deduction in the other, but in each case 
no correction is required for equity: 
(9)  vB(x) = m(x).vA(x/m(x))  &  vB(x) =  vA(x-a(x)) + a(x) 
(compare (7)).  
The specifications in (9) cannot be represented by our (3). For members of group B, the 
same deflator m* = m(xB) or subtraction a* = a(xB) is applied to create equals after tax 
as was used to identify the equals before tax, which our (3) does not do. Muellbauer and 
                                                 
21 Muellbauer and van der Ven (2002) discuss this form of equivalizing in some detail in an optimal tax 
scenario, showing how it could arise if the government's objective is to relate needs to ability but cannot 
due to an unobservability constraint.  
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van de Ven show that there exists a base-dependent equivalence scale which is implicit 
in (almost)  any tax system {tA(x), tB(x)} - the case of a family tax credit included - and 
they also provide an algorithm to recover that scale.22  
The Muellbauer and van der Ven construction thus rationalizes (almost) any tax system 
as horizontally equitable, finding, by the use of positive analysis, the implied 
equivalence scale, which is base-dependent in general. According to this approach, HE 
is imposed from the outside, by assuming rationality on the part of the policymaker, and 
HI analysis all but ruled out.23  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we first explained the value judgements which underlie the concepts of 
VE and HE. We then described the measurement system that stood throughout the 
1990s for capturing the extent of HI in a tax system, and showed that, in essence, 
invoking this methodology amounts to “imposing HI from the outside”. A common 
degree of aversion to both horizontal and vertical inequality is implicit in this 
methodology, and this is why the horizontal and vertical stances of the tax system are 
assessed commensurately. A more recent HI development, that of Auerbach and Hassett 
(2002), breaks the link between horizontal and vertical inequality aversion and brings 
possibilities for deeper analysis.   
We went on to discuss some of the issues that would face the designer of a new income 
tax, taking as a vehicle for this analysis a putative EU-wide income tax, additional to the 
national income taxes of the Member States. By drawing on recent work in the regional 
context, we observed that, relative to a common tax on the (real disposable) incomes of 
                                                 
22 See Muellbauer and van der Ven (2003, pp. 86-90). As the authors remark, “..continuity, monotonicity 
and progressivity are sufficient for the equivalence scale function [m(x) or a(x)] to be unique”. 
 
23 A residual term in Muellbauer and van der Ven’s econometric estimation procedure provides an upper 
bound for HI in their system. It is interesting to note that the studies cited earlier, which “impose HI from 
the outside”, all assume VE, and detect it in terms of the stance of the tax “on average between unequals” 
(following Musgrave, 1990, in fact). In the NR strand of the literature, a suggestion of King (1983) is 
followed, such that the vertical stance of a tax system is given by breaking the disassociation between 
pre- and post-tax living standards, that is, by independently sorting pre- and post-tax living standards 
vectors and making a one-to-one mapping. In each case, analysts effectively “impose VE from the 
outside”. See Lambert (2001, chapter 10) for more on this. 
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all EU citizens, VE could be enhanced, without necessarily introducing HI, by 
admitting an element of differentiation in this tax. By formally modelling the 
identification of equals in different countries through an ‘equivalent income function’, 
we developed a criterion, in equation (3), for the equal treatment command of HE, and 
discussed the design issues this raised. In particular, we showed that a new command, 
“equal progression among equals”, can be achieved if the equals in different countries 
are defined as those at the same given percentile point in their within-country 
distributions, and if these distributions differ in logarithms only by location and scale. 
Differentiated proportional taxes would be equitable in this scenario, the flat rate being 
higher in less unequal countries.  
Finally, we discussed in greater depth the detection of value judgements in an existing 
tax system, adducing recent work of Muellbauer and van der Ven (2002, 2003) which 
allows the analyst to draw out of the tax itself the implied value judgements of the 
decision makers, in terms of an equivalence scale which is in general “base dependent”. 
We observed that this development turns horizontal tax analysis into a positive exercise, 
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